MPRL Publications

On this page, we provide PDF downloads of selected publications. If a PDF is not available, please feel free to to request a copy. The lab's publications are divided into a few broad categories:


Scholarly publications

In press

Ho, M.K., MacGlashan, J., Littman, M.L. & Cushman, F.A. (in press). Social is special: A normative framework for teaching with and learning from evaluative feedback. Cognition.

Barak-Corren, N., Tsay, C.J., Cushman, F.A. & Bazerman, M. (in press). If you're going to do wrong, at least do it right: Considering two moral dilemmas at the same time promotes consistency. Management Science.

Miller, R. M., Cushman, F.A. (in press). Moral values and motivations: How special are they? in K. Gray & J. Graham (eds), The atlas of moral psychology: Mapping good and evil.

Hannikainen, I., Miller, R. M., Cushman, F.A. (in press). Act versus Impact: Conservatives and Liberals Exhibit Different Structural Emphases in Moral Judgment. Ratio: Special Issue on 'Experimental Philosophy as Applied Philosophy'.


Cushman, F.A. (2017). Is non-consequentialism a feature or a bug? In Julian Kiverstein (ed), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. New York, p. 262-279


Gershman, S.J., Gerstenberg, T., Baker, C.L., & Cushman, F.A. (2016). Plans, habits and theory of mind. PLoS One.

Ho, M. K., Littman, M. L., MacGlashan, J., Cushman, F., & Austerweil, J. L. (2016). Showing versus Doing: Teaching by Demonstration. In D. D. Lee, M. Sugiyama, U. von Luxburg, & I. Guyon (Eds.), Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 29 (pp. X–X). Barcelona, Spain: Curran Associates, Inc.

Schweinsberg, et. al. (2016). The Pipeline Project: Pre-Publication Independent Replications of a Single Laboratory's Research Pipeline. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 66: 55-67.

Martin, J.W. & Cushman, F.A. (2016). The adaptive logic of moral luck. In J. Sytsma & W. Buckwalter (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy Wiley, p. 190-202.

Kool, W., Cushman, F.A., & Gershman, S. J. (2016). When does model-based control pay off? PLOS Computational Biology.

Martin, J.W. & Cushman, F.A. (2016). Why we forgive what can't be controlled. Cognition, 147, 133-143.


Cushman, F.A. & Morris, A. (2015). Habitual control of goal selection in humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

Cushman, F.A. (2015). Deconstructing intent to reconstruct morality. Current Opinion in Psychology.

Cushman, F. A. (2015). From moral concern to moral constraint. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 3, 58-62.

Feiman, R., Carey, S., & Cushman, F. A. (2015). Infants' representations of others' goals: Representing approach over avoidance. Cognition, 136, 204-214.

Ho, M., Littman, M., Cushman, F. & Austerweil, J. (2015) Teaching with rewards and punishments: Reinforcement or communication?, Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.

Martin, J.W. & Cushman, F.A. (2015). To punish or to leave: Distinct cognitive processes underlie partner control and partner choice behaviors. PLoS ONE, 10(4), 1-14.

Schwitzgebel, E. & Cushman, F.A. (2015). Philosophers' biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection. Cognition, 141, 127-137.


Bartels, D. M., Bauman, C. W., Cushman, F. A., Pizarro, D. A. & McGraw, A.P. (2014). Moral Judgment and Decision Making. In G. Keren & G. Wu (Eds.), Blackwell Reader of Judgment and Decision Making. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Cushman, F. A. (2014). The neural basis of morality: not just where, but when. Brain, 137, 974-975.

Cushman, F. A. (2014). The psychological origins of the doctrine of double effect. Criminal Law and Philosophy; Special Issue on "The Means Principle."

Cushman, F. A. (2014). Punishment in humans: From intuitions to institutions. Philosophy Compass, 1-16.

Cushman, F. A. (2014). The scope of blame. Commentary on Malle et al. Psychological Inquiry, 25, 201-205.

Miller, R. M., Hannikainen, I., & Cushman, F. A. (2014). Bad actions or bad outcomes? Differentiating affective contributions to the moral condemnation of harm. Emotion 14(3), 573-587.


Cushman, F. A. (2013). Action, outcome and value: A dual-system framework for morality. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 17(3), 273-292.

Cushman, F. A. (2013). The role of learning in punishment, prosociality, and human uniqueness. In K. Sterelny, R. Joyce, B. Calcott, & B. Fraser (Eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution (pp. 333-372). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Cushman, F. A., Sheketoff, R., Wharton, S., & Carey, S. (2013). The development of intent-based moral judgment. Cognition, 127(1), 6-21.

Miller, R. M. & Cushman, F. A. (2013). Aversive for me, wrong for you: First-person behavioral aversions underlie the moral condemnation of harm. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7(10), 707-718.


Cushman, F. A., Durwin, A. J., & Lively, C. (2012). Revenge without responsibility? Judgments about collective punishment in baseball. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48, 1106-1110.

Cushman, F. A., Gray, K., Gaffey, A., & Mendes, W.B. (2012). Simulating Murder: The aversion to harmful action. Emotion, 12(1), 2-7.

Cushman, F. A. & Greene, J. D. (2012). Finding faults: How moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure. Social Neuroscience, 7(3), 269-279, DOI:10.1080/17470919.2011.614000

Dillon, K. D. & Cushman, F. A. (2012). Agent, Patient... ACTION! What the dyadic model misses. Commentary on Gray et al. Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 150-154, DOI:10.1080/1047840X.2012.668002

Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Cushman, F. A. (2012). Benefiting from misfortune: When harmless actions are judged to be morally blameworthy Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(1), 52-62.

Schwitzgebel, E. & Cushman, F.A. (2012). Expertise in moral reasoning? Order effects on moral judgment in professional philosophers and non-philosophers. Mind & Language, 27(2), 135-53.


Cushman, F. A. (2011a). Morality from the frog's eye view. Emotion Reviews, DOI: 10.1177/1754073911402398

Cushman, F. A. & Greene, J. D. (2011). The philosopher in the theater. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Social psychology of morality: The origins of good and evil. APA Press.

Cushman, F. A., Murray, D., Gordon-McKeon, S., Wharton, S., & Greene, J. D. (2011). Judgment before principle: Engagement of the frontoparietal control network in condemning harms of omission. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, DOI:10.1093/scan/nsr072.

Cushman, F. A. & Young, L. (2011). Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations. Cognitive Science, 35: 1052-1075.


Cushman, F. A., Young, L., & Greene, J. (2010). Our multi-system moral psychology: Towards a consensus view. In J. Doris et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Young, L., & Cushman, F. A. (2010). Moral intuitions as heuristics. In J. Doris et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.


Cushman, F. A., Dreber, A., Wang, Y., & Costa, J. (2009). Accidental outcomes guide punishment in a 'trembling hand' game. PLoS One 4(8): e6699.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006699.

Cushman, F.A. & Macindoe, O. (2009). The coevolution of punishment and prosociality among learning agents. In N.A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (Eds.), Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.

Cushman, F. A. & Young, L. (2009). The psychology of dilemmas and the philosophy of morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12(1): 9.

Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E, Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2009). Pushing Moral Buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. Cognition 111(2): 364-371.


Cushman, F. A. (2008). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition 108(2): 353-380. Cognition 108(2): 353-380.

Cushman, F. A., Knobe, J., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Moral judgments impact doing/allowing judgments. Cognition 108(1): 281-289.

Cushman, F. A. & Mele, A. (2008). Intentional action: Two and half folk concepts. In J. Knobe & S. Nichols (Eds.), Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, NY.

Hauser, M. D., Young, L., & Cushman, F. A. (2008). Reviving Rawls' linguistic analogy. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral Psychology and Biology. Oxford University Press, NY.


Hauser, M. D., Cushman, F. A., Young, L., Kang-Xing Jin, R., & Mikhail, J. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications. Mind and Language 22(1): 1-21.

Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F. A., Hauser. M.D., & Damasio, A. (2007). Damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature 446: 908-911.

Mele, A. & Cushman, F. A. (2007). Intentional action, folk judgments and stories: Sorting things out. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31(1): 184-201.

Young, L., Cushman, F. A., Hauser, M. D., & Saxe, R. (2007). The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 104(20): 8235-8240.

2006 and earlier

Cushman, F. A., Young, L., & Hauser, M. D. (2006a). The Psychology of Justice: A review of Natural Justice by Kenneth Binmore. Analyse & Kritik 28:95-98.

Cushman, F. A., Young, L., & Hauser, M. D. (2006b). The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgments: Testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science 17(12): 1082-1089.

Young, L., Cushman, F. A., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., & Hauser, M. D. (2006). Does emotion mediate the relationship between an action's moral status and its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Culture and Cognition 6(1-2): 291-304.

Stevens, J. R., Cushman, F. A., & Hauser, M. D. (2005). Evolving the psychological mechanisms for cooperation. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 36:499-518.

Stevens, J. R. & Cushman, F. A. (2004). Cognitive constraints on reciprocity and tolerated scrounging. Commentary on M. Gurven, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27:4.


For a general audience

Cushman, F. A. (2012). Baseball's brand of revenge models ancient blood feuds Huffington Post Apr. 26.

Cushman, F. A. (2011b). Should the law depend on luck? In M. Brockman (Ed.), What's Next 2.

Cushman, F. A. (2010). Morality: Don't be afraid. New Scientist, 19 Oct. 2010, issue 2782.

Cushman, F. A. (2006a). Aping ethics: Behavioral homologies and nonhuman rights. In M. Hauser, F. Cushman & M. Kamen (Eds.), People, Property or Pets?. Purdue University Press, West Lafayette.

Cushman, F. A. (2006b). The Declaration of Independence: A lab report. In Character. Fall 2006: 50-61.

Hauser, M. D., Cushman, F. A., & Kamen, M. (Eds.). (2006). People, Property or Pets?. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.


Multimedia and web documents

Innovation Hub: The Science of doing the right thing (2015) annual question: Retire the idea that big effects have big explanations (2014) video: The paradox of automatic planning (2013)

PopTech video: The aversion to harm (2013)

Very Bad Wizard podcast: Beanballs, blood feuds, and collective moral responisibility (2013)

Philosophy Bites podcast: Moral luck (2012) annual question: Confabulation (2011) annual question: The new balance: more processing, less memorization (2010)